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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
12150

vs.
KENNETH CHESTNUT,
Defendant..Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT Of NATURE OF CASE
Appellant, State of Utah, appeals from a judgment of the District Court, Third Judicial District,
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Joseph G. J
Judge, dismissing prosecution against the respondent
for insufficient evidence.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURl'
The instant case came on for trial on the charge of
Second Degree .Murder. Afte:r
pres.entation of· th_e
1

State's case the trial court granted a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a judgment determining that
the trial court erred in granting the respondent's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Early .in the evening of September 21, 1969,
Manuel Levi (Lee) Maez, Char lie l\:Iaez and three
friends were in Bambi's Lounge in lHurray, Utah. The
defendant, the owner and operator of Bambi's Lounge,
was also present. -(Tr. 30)
The deceased was playing pool at a table located
at the front of the lounge along with his brother, Charlie,
011e of his.friends and another
.The defendant
at the bar, drinking beer also at the front
was
of the lounge. (Tr. 30)
.. Whether
or on purpose, Charlie_ Maez
broke_ a . cue stick. . The. defendant immediately approached Charie Maez saying that he had broken the
cue stick on purpose and that he would have to pay
for it. As Charlie was reaching for his wallet, apparently
to pay-the defenda·nt, the deceased intervened· saying
that Charlie had not broken the cue stick on purpose
and tjlat he would not pay for it.
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"A few minutes after I got back, Charlie Maez
broke a cue stick, and I turned around after he
broke it and Ken Chestnut was coming over
there, and accusing him of breaking it on purpose. * * * I noticed Charlie start to pull out
his wallet to, pay for it evidently. * * * Well,
then Charles brother, Lee, stepped in between
them and started telling the kid he did not break
it on purpose and he was not going to pay for
it. * * *" (Tr. 35)
An argument ensued, with the defendant asking the
deceased to leave the premises and the deceased refusing.
" ... Ken asked him to leave and he said, 'No,
we are not leaving either.' He just said, 'If you
are not paying for this, get out.' They started
walking up toward the middle of the pool table
and still arguing and Lee said he is not leaving,
and just kind of arguing." (Tr. 62)
The argument continued, culminating in the deceased's
grabbing the defendant by his lapels and asking him
to step outside and calling him various obscene names.
"They argued for a second, and Lee grabbed
Ken by the collar, and asked him to step out.
side, and called Ken a lot of names and everything." (Tr. 35)
"Lee grabbed Ken by the lapel, and he was go.
ing to shove h.iin, and shoved him." (Tr. 62)
The defendant then shook himself free from the deceased's grip.
"Well Ken told him to get out. Lee was really
getting mouthy in there, and so· Ken told him
to leave, and they argueq for a second. Anywciy.
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I don't know how long. Ken looked like he shook
himself loose from him and walked around behind the bar again." (Tr. 36)
With the confrontation apparently ended, the defendant went behind the bar and picked up a sawedoff cue stick. He then returned to the scene of the
original encounter and confronted the deceased by telling him to leave.
"He [Ken] picked up the sawed off cue stick
and came around again and confronted the lHaez
brothers . . . " ( Q. How did he confront him?)
"He told him to get out, he didn't want them
in there - just told them to go out." (Tr. 36)
The defendant was carrying the cue stick in a somewhat
threatening manner at about waist height.
"Q. When Mr. Chestnut came back from behind the bar, in that space of time it took him
to take [sic] to the bar and back, did you observe
where he had the stick, how he was carrying it?
A. It wa.s, oh, maybe at the waist ... " (Tr. 64)

'rhe deceased began cursing again and reached out at
the defendant as if to grab him again.
"Lee stepped toward him and started callmg
him a few names, and stepped forward. I think
he went to grab him again and Ken hit him with
the cue stick." (T+. 37)
lJowever, one witnes:> staied that the deceased made
no fOOveme:nt towards the defendant.
"Q. Now immediately prior to the time you
saw Mr. Chestnut make the blow, did you :;ee
Maez move toward him?
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A. No. No, I don't think he did move.
Q. Do you recall if he made any movement at
all?

A. No, it seemed like he
(Tr. 65).

just standing."

When the deceased was approximately four feet away
from the defendant,
"Q. About how close did Lee Maez get to Mr.
Chestnut at the time Mr. Chestnut hit him?
A. He was fairly close, I would say probably
this far apart. (indicating).

* * *

Q. About how far?

A. Well it would have to be about where I am
standing from you.
MR. BANKS: May the record show approximately four feet?
THE COURT: That seems like just about
it." (Tr. 48, 49)
the defendant struck him on the left side of his head
with the cue stick.
"Q. . .. [A}s he came forward, what, if a11ything,

did you observe Mr. Chestnut do?

"A. lle just hit him on the side of
(demonstrating)." (Tr. 47)
·· ·

head

At that, the deceased's brother jumped on the
ant
fight ensued involving the defendant, and the
deceased's brother and friends. (Tr.
The fight
ended when the defendant threatened .to
the police

call
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and the deceased left with his brother and friends. ( T r.
62A)
The deceased was bleeding profusely from his
\lead wound and his friends tried to convince him to go
to a hospital. He finally agreed to go with them. On
the way, the deceased was nauseous and vomitted twice
before he lapsed into unconsciousness. (Tr. 54)
The deceased was admitted to the Cottonwood
Hospital Emergency Room at approximately 8 :30 p.m.
on September 21 and was initially examined by Dr.
D. C. Bernson at approximately 9:00 P.lH. (Tr. 21)
Dr. Bernson stated that his examination revealed that:
"The patient was having respiratory difficulties, his respirations were labored and slow to
begin with, his limbs were stiff, his respirations
shallow and rapid, which is an indication
of brain damage. * * *His respiration converted
to a very rapid type of breathing, very shallow
and
. . very rapid, [this} is indication- of brain stem

111Jury.

"Before his admission to the hospital,· x-rays
of
were taken, indicating a very hairline, very plainly, fracture through the parietal
aiea, which is midline. He did not respond to
any form of
and that type of
'thing.
·
"About this tin1e we had him admitted to the
possible, and his conintense care unit as soon
dition was considered critical. * * * \Vith the
amount of injury to the brain stem, with those
symptoms developing that rapidly after injury,
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the outlook or prognosis had to be very guarded,
or uncertain." (Tr. 20)
The deceased expired September 23, 1969 at approximately 2:40 p.m. (Tr. 21).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY ON
THE OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER.
The appellant contends that the State presented
sufficient evidence on the offense of second degree
murder to warrant the case being submitted to the jury
on that issue. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to allow the jury to decide a criminal case, the
evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the
State. In State v. Brennan ,13 Utah 2d 195, 371P.2d27,
(1962) the court reviewed the state's appeal from an
order of dismissal at the conclusion of the state's case
in a prosecution for violation of 41-6-44 UCA, 1953.
In that case the court said:
"The defendant's motion for dismissal having
been granted, in analyzing the evidence to see
if a case could be made out against him, we
review it in the light most favorable to the
13 Utah 2d
197.
,
Section 76.30-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
fines wur<ler as f oµows:
7

"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought."
Section 76-30-2, U.C.A., 1953 defines malice as
follows:
"Such malice may be express or implied. It is
express when there is manifested a deliberate
intention unlawfully to take the life of a fellow
creature. It is implied when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart."
The differentiation between the degrees of murder
is set out in Section 76-30-3, U.C.A., 1953:
"Every murder perpetuated by poison, lying
in wait or any other kind of willful, deliberate,
malicious and premeditated killing; or any arson,
rape, burglary or robbery; or perpetuated from
premeditated design unlawfully and malic;iously
to effect the death of any human being other
than the one who is killed; or perpetrated by
any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others
and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of
human life ;-is murder in the first degree. Any
other homicide committed under such circumstances as would have constituted murder at common law is murder in the second degree."·
..

Therefore, in order to sustain appellanf s contentions that the evidence was sufficient to send the case
to the. j1:1ry, this court. m!-lst merely find from viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant, that no reasonable judge or· jury could have
concluded that the .evidence presented demonstrateJ a
violation of the cited statutes.
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Appellant agrees at the outset that the elements
constituting first degree murder set out in Section 7630-3, U.C.A., 1953, are not established by the evidence.
However, appellant submits the evidence does establish a prima facie case of second degree murder.
In order to find second degree murder it must be
established that the killing was a murder. Murder, as
defined in Section 76-30-1, above, is divided into two
elements: 1) unlawful killing of a human being; and
2) with malice aforethought. Whether a killing is unlawful is the ultimate issue in any trial involving a killing. A killing is unlawful when a killing of a human
being takes place which is not excusable or justifiable
under the U.C.A. A defense that the killing was not
unlawful is an affirmative defense and does not enter
into consideration until the defendant brings forth evidence. In any case it is a question for the jury. The
element of malice aforethougqt has been explained in
St.ate v.
117 Utah 237, 251, 214 P.2d 626
(l950).
" 'Malice aforethought' is a state of mind. The
'aforetpought' is the giving thought beforehand
to malicious feelings or desires. It has no implication of adopting a plan of action t-0 exercise
those feelirigs or desires. 'Malice' as applied to
murder . . . is the wish to kill, or to do great
bodily harm or to do an act knoWing. that its rea:.
sonable and natural consequence would be-death
or greq,t bodily harm." (Emphasis added)
.Tht; mental element +efer+ed to above can be iµ
either of three forms: 1) intent to kill; 2) . iutent to do
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great bodily harm; or 3) the intent to do an act knowing
that its reasonable and natural consequences would be
death or great bodily harm. The first form involves
express malice, the second and third forms involve implied malice, Section 76-30-2, U.C.A., 1953, supra.
In determining whether the required mens rea is
present, this court observed in State v. Cobo, 90 Utah
89, 60 p .2d 952 ( 1936) :
"This statutory definition is but declaratory of
the common law. At common law, to constitute
voluntary manslaughter the killing must be willful or intentional or there must exist an intention
at least to do bodily harm. The intention may
be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon,
but if the weapon is not deadly the intent to kill
cannot be inferred, but must appear from other
and additional evidence." 90 Utah at 96.
Although speaking of voluntary manslaughter, second
degree murder and voluntary manslaughter require the
same basic mental states.

If a reasonable judge or jury could have inferred

from any of the evidence submitted as a part of the
State's case that the defendant had any of the required
mental states, then this court must conclude that there
was sufficient evidence for the case to have been submitted to the jury and that the trial court erred in so
refusing.
The testimony of the witnesses is clear that there
we+e words spoken between the deceased and the defendant; there were some offensive touchings; but, there
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was a breaking off of the altercation and a cooling-off
period during which the defendant picked up a sawed
off cue stick and resumed the altercation by confronting
the deceased. This second argument, according to one
witness, ended with the defendant striking the deceased
with the pool cue on the side of the head upon provocation which the appellant submits was legally insufficient to negate the idea of malice.
The deceased, according to witness Pamela Bennion, made no move towards the defendant during the
second confrontation. She testified that the defendant
and the deceased were merely arguing when the defendant struck the deceased on the side of the head,
ultimately causing his death. Other witnesses testified
that the deceased grabbed at the defendant, but did not
actually touch him.
In People v. Calton, 5 Utah 451, 16 P. 902 (1888}
[reversed on other grounds, Calton v. Utah, 130 U.S.
83, 32 L. Ed. 870, 9 S. Ct. 435), this court reviewed
a jury instruction on the adequacy of provocation necessary to negate malice. It found no error in the following
instruction:
"To reduce homicide to the degree of man,..
slaughter on the ground solely that it was committed in the heat of passion, the provocation
must have been considerable; in other words;
such as was calculated to give rise to irresistablepassion in the mind of a reasonable person. No
sljght or trivial provocation, such as is
ca!culated lo engender uncontrollable passion m
any ordinary man, will suffice." 5 Utah at 459.
11

The use of a deadly weapon evidences the intent
to kill (State v. Cobo, supra) or at least the actions of
the defendant in so striking the deceased "manifested
a deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of a
fellow creature." U.C.A., 1953, Section 76-30-2). There
is testimony that when the defendant resumed the altercation, he argued with the deceased and then simply
struck him. From these additional circumstances, the
v. Cobo, supra.
intent to kill can be inferred.
Taking the fact situation set forth above, if the
court does not agree that the actions described constitute an intent to kill then it is submitted that they are
s1dficient to establish an intent to do great bodily injury
to the deceased.
The defendant struck the deceased upon the head
with a heavy blunt instrument using such force that
the doctor who initially examined the deceased testified
that in his opiriion "death occurred as a result of what
we call paralysis of the brain stem; this, in turn, was
dqe 'to the severe contusion or bruising and swelling
and injury to the brain stem, fas a result of] the blows
on the head." (Tr. 22) (Emphasis added). It can be
inferred from the force applied by the defendant in
striking the deceased, upon inadeqqate provocation, that
defeqdant 4ad the :required malice to constitute
second degree rp.urder within the meaning of Sec. 70ao. "lt is implied . . . when the circtµnstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
jury could have found the accused did an
heart.''
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act intending the natural and probable consequences
fiowing from the act, to wit: to do great bodily harm.
State v. Peterson, 22 U.2d 377, 453, P.2d 696 ( 1969).
Again taking the facts cited above, the court must
at least inf er that the defendant, as a reasonable man,
knew that striking the deceased with a heavy cue stick
on the head would probably kill him or injure him.
The testimony offered by the prosecution clearly
showed that the defendant intended to hit the deceased.
A reasonable man should know that such an act would
do great bodily injury to the victim.
Therefore, the State's evidence was sufficient to
show that the defendant had malice aforethought when
he hit the deceased because the jury could have concluded from the evidence that either of the mental states required to establish the malice aforethought element of
second degree murder existed at the.time of the striking.
In the instant case, the provocation was at most a
threatening touching. In the light most favorable to the
state, the evidence shows that the provocation was merely
some spoken words. This is not sufficient provocation to
make out manslaughter. Clark & Marshall, Crimes,
6th Ed. p. 627; I Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedures, p. 529. It is clear that the provocation in this case
give rise
was not considerable nor was it sufficient
to irresistable passion in the min& of a reasonable man.
Therefore, appellant submits that the provocation was
insufficient to negate the malice of the defendant.

to
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUllMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY ON
THE INCLUDED OFFENSE OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.
If the court does not agree that the State presented
sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury on
second degree murder, the appellant contends that the
trial court erred in dismissing the case because the
State's case was sufficient to set out the elements of
voluntary manslaughter.
This court can review the evidence on the lesser
included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter when it is sufficient to make out the elements
of those lesser included offenses. Stat.e v. Brennan,
supra. This court in explaining the principles in State
v. Cobo, supra, said,

"It is also said in that decision [State v. Cobo]
that the court, being required by statute to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the
crime charged in the information, should, even
though no request is made for it, charge the jury
with respect to the included offenses when the
evidence so justifies." State v. Smith, 90 Utah
482, at 493, 62 P.2d 1110. (1936).
Therefore, if the court can review included offenses
when no request is made, the court can certainly review
whether the case presented justifies the presentment
to. the jury of the issue of the included charges.

14

Sec. 76-30-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines
manslaughter as follows:
is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds:
I) Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or in the
heat of passion.
2) Involuntary, in the commission of an unlaw-

ful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death in an unlawful manner or without due
caution and circumspection.
Voluntary manslaughter is similar to second degree
murder except that voluntary manslaughter does not
require malice on the part of the slayer. Instead, the
motivating force behind the deadly act must rise out of
a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, upon reasonable provocation.
As this court said in People v. Calton, supra:
"In order to determine whether the accused in
any given case acted from reason or passion,
the provocation, the weapon used (if any), the
preparation for the act, his expression, and all
the circumstances must be considered; and although it appears that the act proceeded to some
extent from malice, upon reflection and calculation, and to some extent from passion, that will
be held to be the cause which had the preponderating influence. There must be sudden passion,
the
upon reasonable pr()vocation, to
idea of malice; and. the passion µmst proceed
from what the law accepts as adequate cause;
else it will not reduce the feloneous ·l\illing to
mansl:iughter." 5 Utah ..at 460.
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As noted in Point I, if the provocation does not
proceed from adequate cause, then the malice aforethought cannot be negated and the killing is necessarily second degree murder. If the evidence requires
the finding that the provocation was adequate in law,
then the malice of the slayer is negated, and the offense
is reduced to a maximum of voluntary manslaughter.
In the event that this court finds the provocation adequate, it is submitted that if the court finds any evidence
from which a jury could have concluded that the defendant had committed voluntary manslaughter, then
the court must find that the trial court erred in ref using
to submit the case to the jury.
The court, in State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102,
396 P.2d 414 (1964), stated that the three basic mental
states discussed in point I must be shown in order that
the jury be allowed to decide the issue of voluntary
manslaughter.

1

.

"We have said many times that in 'voluntary
there must be an intention to kill
or do gr(at bodily harm or to do aq act knowing
the natural and probable consequences thereof
will be death or great bodily harm.' However,
such act must not be previously planned or in
cool blood, thought out beforehand, bµt must be
committed op., 'a sudden quarrel or in the heat
of passio11: 'fhis is said to be the common
definition of voluntary manslaughter, which this
state adopted by our statutes." State v. Gallegos, 16
2d 102, 396 P.2d 414 (1964).
The arguments
in Point I concerning the
of the evidence to the various intents re-
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quired is also applicable here. The testimony is clear that
a quarrel had taken place involving the deceased and
the defendant. When the quarrel was broken off and
the defendant went behind the bar and picked up the
pool cue, it is submitted that either the defendant
acquired the malice aforethought sufficiently to constitute second degree murder or, the killing must have
occurred upon reasonable provocation and therefore
without malice, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
passion, thus making out the elements of voluntary
manslaughter. That is, if the quarrel was broken off
long enough for the defendant to have cooled down
so that the preponderating influence was not the passion
aroused during the quarrel, then the defendant acquired
the malice aforethought which was sufficient to make
out the necessary elements of second degree murder
by obtaining the cue stick from behind the bar for the
purpose of doing an act which would probably inflict
upon the deceased great bodily injury. But, if the
quarrel was not broken off long enough for the defendant to have cooled down, and if 'the provocation was
legally adequate, then the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, and thus, the
evidence makes out the elements of voluntary manslaughter.

If the court is of the opinion that the evidence did
not show that the killing occurred during the h_eat of
passion, and if it finds no showing that. the
was legally inadequate, then the appellant conten9.s that
the evidence showed that the defendant imprpperJy
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ercised his rights of self-defense. Respondent used
deadly force when confronted, at best, with only non
deadly force thus he exceeded the bounds of self defense, Perkins, Criminal Law, p. 883 etc. ( 1957) . That
is to say, if the court believes that the only conclusion
that can be drawn from the evidence is that the provocation was adequate to negate malice, the appellant's
position is that the evidence shows that the provocation
was inadequate to permit the use of deadly force to
repel the provocation.
In this type of situation, defendant's malice has
been negated by the provocation. However, if the defendant overstepped the rights of self-defense allowed
him by the provocation, then it is submitted that malice
(by way of existence of any of the three required mental
states, supra) can be inf erred) thus making out the
elements of second degree murder.
"In no case will an assault, however violent,
mitigate the offense, if there was malice. And
malice may well be inferred if the retaliation
was outrageous in nature, either in the manner
or the circumstances of it, and beyond all proportion to the provocation, 'because,' as it has
been said, 'it manifests rather a diabolical depravity than the fraility of human nature.' "
Cla.rk & Marshall on Crimes, 7th ed., 699.
If the court is of the opinion that the malice cannot
be so inferred, then the appellant submits that the inference
be made that the killing must have occurred
in the heat of passion along with at ieast one of the

18

required three mental states, thus making out the elements of voluntary manslaughter.
If the court is of the opinion that the evidence
established that the killing did not occur in the heat
of passion, then the appellant contends that the imperfect self-defense indulged in by defendant was a
lawful act (because adequately provoked) done in an
unlawful manner (by use of deadly force where not
necessary) . Thus the evidence makes out the elements
of involuntary manslaughter, discussed below.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUBTHE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF INVOLUNTARY
:YIANSLAUGHTER ON THE BASIS THAT:
A. DEATH OCCURRED IN THE COlVIMISSION OF AN UNLAWFUL ACT N 0 T
AMOUNTING TO A FELONY, OR
B. DEATH OCCURRED IN THE COlVIMISSION OF A LAWFUL ACT WHICH MIGHT
PRODUCE DEATH IN AN UNLAWFUL MANNER.
If the court does not agree that the elements of
second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter have
been established by the State's evidence the appellant
contends that at least the elements of involuntary manslaughter were established.

19

As noted in Point II, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Sec. 76-30-5 ( 2) defines involuntary manslaughter as
being of two categories. The first when the killing
occurs "in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony," to wit: a battery. The second is when
the killing occurs "in the commission of a lawful act
which might produce death in an unlawful manner or
without due caution and circumspection."
A: U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 76-7-3 defines battery as
" ... any wilful and unlawful use of force or violence
upon the person of another." Sec. 76-7-4 says that battery
is punishable as a misdemeanor.
Taking the evidence of the incident on September
21, 1969 as adduced by the state, it shows that the defendant committed a battery on the deceased which
caused his death. The testimony shows that the defendant confronted the deceased with a heavy cue stick
and after some argument struck him on the head with
that weapon. Although some witnesses stated that the
deceased provoked the defendant during the second
argument by lunging at him with hand outstretched
one witness, Pamela Bennion, stated that the deceased
made no movement towards the defendant. Thus, the
evidence is that the defendant struck the deceased- and
committed a battery upon. him. Since the examining
doctors we+e both of the opinion tha.t the deceased died
as a result of a blow to the head and since the
case shows that_ the defendant struck that blow, the
killing occurred "in the commission of an unlawful act
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not amounting to a felony," to wit: a battery. U.C.A.
1953, Sec. 76-30-5 (2). Therefore the state's case established the elements of involuntary manslaughter
sufficiently to convince a reasonable judge or jury that
the offense had been committed and that the defendant
did the act.
B: If the court does not agree that there was an
unlawful battery, or if, as discussed in Point II, the
court does not agree that a finding that the provocation
was reasonable requires a conclusion that the killing
occurred in the heat of passion, then the appellant contends that the elements of the second category of involuntary manslaughter were established.
Sec. 76-30-5 (2) U.C.A., 1963 defines involuntary
manslaughter as a killing without malice aforethought
when the killing results from a lawful act done in an
unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. In the case at hand, the defendant struck and
killed the deceased after a quarrel. During that quarrel
the deceased grabbed the defendant by the lapels and
shouted and threatened him. Thereafter there was a
break in the argument. The defendant obtained a cue
stick and confronted the deceased. Some witnesses testified to some threatening gesture by the deceased before
the defendant struck him, but one witness testified there
was no such gesture.
If the court is of the opinion that this evidence
established reasonable provocation and that the battery
wa5 a lawful exercise of self-defense then the appel.laµt
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contends that the lawful act was done in a manner which
was unlawful.
If the deceased's act was sufficient to allow selfdefense, then it must be determined whether the force
actually used was justified. As this court said in State
v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324 ( 1944),
"Unless the evidence is so conclusive that every
reasonable mind must say that the means and the
force used were necessary to defend against aggression the question of 'Yhether the killing was
in self defense is a question for the jury to determine." 106 Utah at 201, 202.
The doctor who initially examined the deceased
testified that the blow was so severe that he diagnosed
the injury as a brain stem injury and testified that the
cause of death was paralysis or contusion of the brain
stem. That is to say, the force was so great that the
b:rain was jarred away from the skull.
If the court can find any evidence whatsoever in
the record from which it can draw the conclusion that
the deceased did not use such force that the defendant
was permitted to use deadly force to defend himself
then the court must find that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case. The state's case, at the very least,
established the elements of involuntary manslal!ghter.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that, taking the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, the court must find that
the evidence was sufficient to require that the issues
be submitted to the jury for decision on the basis that:
I) The elements of second degree murder were

established by the evidence showing that the defendant
had at least the intent to do an act, the reasonable consequences thereof being great bodily injury to allow
the inference of malice aforethought as required.
2) If the court is of the opinion that the malice

was negated by adequate provocation, then the elements
of voluntary manslaughter have been made out by the
evidence in that the killing occurred upon a sudden
quarrel or in the heat-of passion.
-

.

3) If the court is of the opinion that there is no

evidence from which the jury could conclude that passion was the preponderating influence, then the evi·
dence is sufficient to submit the case to the jury on the
issue of involuntary manslaughter.
a) If the provocation was inadequate to allow
the defendant to defend himself, then the killing
occurred in the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, to wit. a battery.
b) If the provocation was adequate to allow
the defendant to defend himself, then because the
right to defend, the
defendant went beyond
23

killing occurred in the commission of a lawful act
in an unlawful manner.
When the instant facts are so analyzed it is apparent that the lower court committed error in refusing
to submit the case to the jury. The court should reverse.
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